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I.

INTRODUCTION

Ninety-nine percent of Americans breathe their first breaths in a hospital,' while twenty-nine percent live the last days of their lives there.2 The
Supreme Court highlighted in a labor rights case the premise that
"'[h]ospitals carry on a public function of the utmost seriousness and importance[,]"' and "'give rise to unique considerations that do not apply in
.

I thank my family, Ruthann Robson, and Hilary Klein.

1.

U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, TRENDS IN OUT-OF-HOSPITAL BIRTHS IN THE

UNITED STATES, 1990-2012, 1 (2012), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/products/databriefs/dbl44.htm.
2. See Margaret Jean Hall et al., Trends in inpatienthospital deaths: National Hospital Discharge
Survey, 2000-2010, NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS DATA BRIEF, no. 118, at 1 (2013),

http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/dbl18.pdf (715,000 inpatient hospital deaths in 2010 out of 2.5
million).

33

Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 2016

1

North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 39, No. 1 [2016], Art. 4

NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW REVIEW

34

[Vol. 39:1

A cornerstone of caring for hospital patients is
the industrial settings. ...
the physician-patient relationship, which has been identified as deserving of
special protection under the law; 4 and "the importance of physician dress on
the patient-physician relationship can be traced back to Hippocrates, who
stated that the physician 'must be clean in person, well dressed, and anointed with sweet-smelling unguents. . . .

Not only is a patient's trust and

confidence significantly associated with professional dress, but so is a patient's willingness to adhere to prescribed therapy, and to share social, sexual, and psychological problems.
The principle of hijab in the religion of Islam refers to the covering of a
woman's head and body out of modesty.' The chapter of the Qur'an pertaining to hijab is the Surat an-Nur (Q 24:30-31), where it is written that a
woman's modesty requires "believing women [to] lower their gaze and
guard their modesty and that they should not display their beauty and ornaof hijab is a cloth covering of the
ments... .". The most common form
9
recognized as a "headscarf" by courts and
popularly
head and neck, and is
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC").o While the
four main schools of Islamic jurisprudence do not believe that a veil covering a woman's face is required, some scholars interpret the Qur'an to require such covering," and in some countries interpreting the Qur'an very
strictly, such as Saudi Arabia, it is a punishable offense for a woman to
appear in public without a veil covering her face.1 2 Such covering may
come in the form of a burqa or a niqab. 13 The niqab is a face veil that allows for the eyes to remain uncovered; while the burqa, also spelled burka,
completely covers the face, allowing for sight through a mesh screen. 14

3. Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB., 437 U.S. 483, 508 (1978) (quoting NLRB v. Beth Israel Hosp.,
554 F.2d 477, 481 (1st Cir. 1977), af'd, 437 U.S. 483 (1978)).
4. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996) (psychotherapist-patient privilege).
5. Shakaib U. Rehman et al., What to Wear Today? Effect of Doctor's Attire on the Trust and
Confidence ofPatients, 118 AM. J. MED., 1279, 1280 (2005) (quoting 2 HIPPOCRATES 311-12 (Harvard
University Press 1923)).
6. Id. at 1283-84.
7.

Kendra Sarna, Hiab, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GLOBAL RELIGION, 515, 515 (Mark Juergensmeyer

& Wade Clark Roof ed., 2012); Mary Ali, Why Do Muslim Women Cover Their Head?, INST. OF
ISLAMIC INFO. & EDUC., http://www.iiie.net/index.php?q=node/37 (last visited Oct. 30, 2016).
8. SARNA, supranote 8; ALI, supra note 8.
9. What's the Diference Between a Hifab, Niqab and Burka?, BBC NEwSROUND (June 18,
2015), http://www.bbc.co.uk/newsround/24118241; see also Sarna, supra note 8.
10. E.E.O.C. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 731 F.3d 1106, 1111 (10th Cir. 2013), rev'd and
135 S. Ct. 2028 (2015).
U.S. -,
remanded, -,
11. Cassandra M. Vogel, Note, An Unveiling: Exploring the Constitutionality of a Ban on Face
Coverings in Public Schools, 78 BROOK. L. REv. 741, 748 (2013).
12. Id. at 747.
13. What's the Difference Between a Hyab, Niqab and Burka?, supranote 10.
14. Id.
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The workplace environment can be hostile-and sometimes downright
horrific-for Muslim women who practice hijab. Muslim women employees filing discrimination claims allege that they have been told to "take the
'rag' off [their] head"; 1 that they have been called "evil" compared to other "good Christian" coworkers;' 6 that their daughters have been forbidden
from waiting for them in the lobby of their workplace, while other children
were allowed to come into the office and wait for their mother. 17 One woman alleged that her shift leader forcibly removed her headscarfin front of
male co-workers.18

In 2009, the Egyptian Ministry of Health banned nurses from wearing
niqab in the hospital.19 The Washington Post reported in 2011 that a Muslim nurse at Columbia Hospital for Women in Washington, D.C. had been
hired after wearing a veil to her job interview, but was later told that it was
interfering with her ability to relate to patients.20
Can a hospital in the U.S. legally prevent a nurse from wearing a burqa?
This Article explores the scientific and cultural origins of the notion that
face-to-face communication is important, and how it may impact patient
care. The Article then examines how nurses at city hospitals in states with
religious freedom laws may be afforded the greatest protection while their
counterparts at federal facilities may be unable to rely on similar federal
laws-or even civil rights actions-because of a 1976 Supreme Court decision by Justice Potter Stewart, wherein Justice John Paul Stevens joined by
Justice William Brennan articulated a compelling dissent. Finally, the Article examines how the captive nature of the hospital may trigger Establishment Clause concerns and impact the First Amendment rights of the patient.
II.

THE FACE OF HUMANS AND PRIMATES

The idea that a woman should cover her head is not unique to the Qur'an.
In the Holy Bible, Paul wrote to the Corinthians that a woman's long hair is
15. Ahmed v. Astoria Bank, No. 14-CV-4595, 2016 WL 1254638, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31,
2016).
16. Huri v. Office of the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook Cty., 804 F.3d 826, 830 (7th
Cir. 2015).
17. Id
18. Elhassan v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., No. 1:12CV1039, 2014 WL 1281231, at *1
(M.D.N.C. Mar. 27, 2014).
19. Valentina Colombo, Europe: Behind the Burqa Debate, GATESTONE INSTITUTE (Mar. 12,
2010, 5:00 AM), http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/l 104/behind-the-burqa-debate-in-europe.
20. Steve Hendrix, The Few US. Muslim Women Who Choose Full Veil Face Mix ofHarassment,
Sympathy. WASH. POST (Apr 13, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/the-few-us-muslimwomen-who-choose-full-veil-face-mix-of-harassment-sympathy/2011/04/13/AFLrwzYD story.html. As
a side note, the Columbia Hospital for Women is now a luxury condominium called "The Columbia.";
See The Columbia, LIFE AT THE TOP, http://www.lifeatthetop.com/condo/thecolumbia (last visited Oct.
30, 2016).
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given to her as a covering-and asked whether it is proper for a woman to
pray without her head covered. 2 1 Paul also wrote in 1 Corinthians, "[fjor
now we see through a glass, darkly; but then face to face: now I know in
part; but then shall I know even as also I am known." 22 Religious scholars
have interpreted this phrase to signify that by seeing someone face-to-face
you are able to achieve the highest possible understanding; a "complete
mutuality of knowledge." 23 One legal scholar in his analysis of a proposed
ban on the face veil for public employees in Quebec pointed to this verse as
a possible genealogical theory for the notion that face-to-face communication is important.24
Scientific studies indicate a more innate explanation for the importance
of the face in past and modem societies. Evidence exists that the human
brain is uniquely designed to recognize faces, which requires a highly efficient process enabling us to identify minute deviations from the similar
configuration of two eyes above a nose and a mouth,25 while only a fraction
of the population is unable to recognize such patterns.26 This specialized
form of recognition depends on specific areas of the brain that are activated
by face-like patterns. 2 7 Damage to the most prominent face-specialized
area of the brain, known as the fusiform gyrus, which undergoes stronger
responses to faces than to any other stimuli, can lead to the inability to recognize individual faces.28 Another hypothesis is that the face is a complex
stimuli-but not necessarily a special one-and that the face-specialized
areas of the brain only become specialized through repeated exposure and
study. 29 Regardless of whether facial recognition is a natural function or an
expertise developed through repetition, humans show a preference for facial

21. 1 Corinthians11:13-15.
22. 1 Corinthians13:12.
23. Robert Leckey, Face to Face, 3 O&ATI SOCio-LEGAL SERIES 1184, 1190 (2013), (first citing
Anthony.C.Thiselton, FIRST CORINTHIANS: A SHORTER EXEGETICAL AND PASTORAL COMMENTARY

232 (2006); and then quoting Charles Kingsley Barret, A COMMENTARY OF THE FIRST EPISTLE TO THE
CORINTHIANS 307 (1968)).
24. Id.
25. David Leopold & Gillian Rhodes, A Comparative View of Face Perception, 124 J. COMP.
PSYCHOL. 233, 234 (2010).
26. See Alison M. Harris & Geoffrey K. Aguirre. Prosopagnosia,17 CURRENT BIOLOGY R7, R7
(Jan. 9, 2007)( People suffering from prosopagnosia, also known as face-blindness, are unable to recognize the faces of other individuals, sometimes even those of family members.); see id at R7-R8 (Prosopagnosia may be acquired through brain injury, but it may also be congenital or developmental.); see
also Nicholas Bakalar, Just Another Face in the Crowd, IndistinguishableEven ifIt's Your Own, N.Y.
TIMES, July 18, 2006, at F5 (Recent research indicates that around 2.47% of the population may suffer
from prosopagnosia.).
27. LEOPOLD, supra note 27, at 234.
28. Id.
29.

Brady I. Phelps, Prosopagnosia,in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CHILD BEHAVIOR & DEVELOPMENT,

1166, 1667 (Sam Goldstein & Jack A. Naglieri eds., 2011).
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stimuli. 30 Infants as young as 4 months of age naturally prefer facial stimuli

'

over other forms.3 1 Newborn infants are able to distinguish facial patterns
and form a preference for their mother's face within days of birth.32
As with facial recognition, human and non-human primates are also
highly developed for communication through facial expressions. 33 Parts of
the human brain are uniquely stimulated by the facial expressions and eye
gaze of others, which can directly influence the observer's own emotional
state.34 The interaction between humans through their eyes is an important
feature of social interaction, and is abnormal in psychiatric conditions.
Eyes provide insight into attentiveness, engagement, intent, and focus of
interest. 36 The musculature on the face of primates is highly elaborate, allowing for communication of a wider array of thoughts and emotions
through facial expression than other mammals, which rely less on vision
and more on olfaction and audition for social communication. 3 7 An expansion of primate face mobility during primate evolution may reflect an increased importance of "visual social exchange." 38 There is also evidence
that facial expressions transcend cultures. In studies of people from 21 different countries, 39 the majority in every country agreed on the recognition
of happiness, sadness, and disgust; while for surprise there was agreement
by the majority in 20 out of the 21 countries, for fear in 19 out of 21, and
for anger in 18 out of 21.40 The same expressions were shown to people in
the South Fore community of Papua New Guinea, a population living in
complete isolation-a community that had never seen a photograph, magazine, film or television, and similar results were achieved.4
In the practice of law, there is explicit recognition of the importance of
being able to read visual cues on a person's face. The Confrontation Clause
of the Sixth Amendment dictates that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against
30.

Mark Pennick, FacialRecognition, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CHILD BEHAVIOR & DEVELOPMENT,

634, 634 (Sam Goldstein & Jack A. Naglieri eds., 2011).
31. Id.
32. LEOPOLD, supra note 27, at 234.
33. Id at 235.
34. Id at 234.
35. Id
36. Id
37. Id at 236, 239.
38. Id at 236.
39. Paul Ekman, FacialExpressions, in HANDBOOK OF COGNITION AND EMOTION, 301, 305 (Tim
Dalgleish & Mick J. Power eds., 1999) ("Africa (this included subjects from more than one country in
Africa, and is the only group who were not tested in their own languages but in English), Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, China, England, Estonia, Ethiopia, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Kirghizistan,
Malaysia, Scotland, Sweden, Indonesia (Sumatra), Switzerland, Turkey and the USA.").
40. Id.
41. Id. at 308.
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and in the words of Supreme Court Justice John Marshall Harlan,
"[s]imply as a matter of English the clause may be read to confer nothing
more than a right to meet face to face all those who appear and give evidence at trial." 4 3 The reasoning behind the clause was not only to allow for
personal cross-examination of the witness, but also to "[compel] him to
stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and
judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his
testimony whether he is worthy of belief."44
The definition of the word "face" in the Oxford English Dictionary occupies six pages, of which only a small part is dedicated to the physical aspect
of "[t]he front part of the head, from the forehead to the chin[,]" and the rest
on the importance of the face in society, like the significance and history of
the phrases "to have two faces[,]" meaning to be guilty of duplicity; "to
look (a person, etc.) in the face[,]" meaning to "meet with a steady gaze that
implies courage, confidence, or (sometimes) defiance;" and "face to face[,]"
meaning to confront. 45 The importance of the visual aspects of one's face in
knowing and communicating with that person is at least anecdotally
demonstrated by the success of the widely popular social media website
Facebook.
him[,]"

THE HOSPITAL'S OBLIGATION TO REASONABLY
III.
ACCOMMODATE THE NURSE'S RELIGIOUS PRACTICE
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196446 makes it unlawful for "[a]n
employer [to] take an adverse employment action against an applicant or
employee because of any aspect of that individual's religious observance or
practice unless the employer demonstrates that it is unable to reasonably
accommodate that observance or practice without undue hardship."47
If there are any reasonable accommodations, it is important that the hospital thoroughly explore them along with the nurse.48 In E.E. 0. C. v. Reads,
Inc., a private company providing counselors to schools refused to hire an
applicant because she wore a headscarf for fear that the company would be
in violation of state law prohibiting teachers from wearing religious garb in
42. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
43. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 175 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
44. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895) (emphasis added).
45.

5 OxFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 641 (2d ed. 1989).

46. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(j) (2012).
47. E.E.O.C. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2034, 192 L. Ed. 2d 35 (2015)
(J. Alito, concurring) (emphasis added).
48. E.E.O.C. v. Reads, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 1150, 1161 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (attributing liability to employer that neglected to examine whether headcoverings with a fashionable appearance would have been
suitable to employer's primary school client operating under state law preventing employees from
wearing religious garb).
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school.49 In attributing liability to the company, the court highlighted its
failure to investigate compromises, including proposals that were submitted
by the applicant herself as to how she may be able to fashionably wear her
headscarf in a manner that did not make her faith apparent.50 "To the contrary, [the company] rejected [the applicant's] accommodation without
knowing whether the [proposed alternative] headcoverings would be perceived as religious[,]" and thereby in violation of Title VII.51 The company

neither consulted legal counsel nor submitted the employee's application to
the school district to see if a solution could be found.52
"[T]o avoid Title VII liability, the employer need not offer the accommodation the employee prefers. Instead, when any reasonable accommodation is provided, the statutory inquiry ends."5 3 The National Health Service
(NHS) in the United Kingdom, the country's nationalized healthcare and
hospital system, has indicated that preventing an employee from wearing
clothing which covers the face while facing patients and allowing for such
wear while on break or eating lunch would be a reasonable accommodation. 5 4 In the United States there is a split among the Circuit Courts as to
whether an accommodation must completely eliminate the conflict between
work and religion in order to be reasonable.55 In the Fourth and Eighth Circuits an accommodation need not totally eliminate the conflict in order to
be reasonable, in contrast with the Second, Seventh and Ninth Circuits.56

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals applied the requirement of complete
elimination of conflict when it held that a shift change allowing for an employee who believes he must abstain from work on Sunday to attend church
while requiring him to work on Sunday is not a reasonable accommodation. 57 For employees who believe that the Qur'an requires them to cover
their body and face outside of the home, the British remedy would certainly
fail to alleviate the conflict and would thus be unreasonable in any court
requiring complete alleviation.
49. Id. at 1152-53, 1155.
50. Id. at 1161.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1160-61.
53. Cosme v. Henderson, 287 F.3d 152, 158 (2d Cir. 2002) (relying on Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v.
Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 69 (1986)).
54. NAT'L HEALTH SERV., WEARING FACE VEILS IN THE WORKPLACE,

(Sept.

9, 2013),

http://nhsemployers.org/your-workforce/plan/building-a-diverse-workforce/need-to-know/wearing-faceveils-in-the-workplace.
55. See 1 Merrick T. Rossein, Employment Discrimination Law and Litigation § 3:5 (2016).
56. See id.
57. Baker v. The Home Depot, 445 F.3d 541, 548 (2d Cir. 2006).
58. See id (an accommodation is not a reasonable one if it does not "eliminate the conflict between the employment requirement and the religious practice."); E.E.O.C. v. Alamo Rent-A-Car LLC,
432 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1013 (D. Ariz. 2006) (allowing employee to cover her hair during Ramadan while
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THE UNDUE HARDSHIP DEFENSE

The hospital may argue that allowing a nurse to be fully veiled while interacting with patients would cause an "undue hardship." An accommodation causes "undue hardship" if it results in "more than a de minimis cost"
to the employer." "The [EEOC] will determine what constitutes 'more than
a de minimis cost' with due regard given to the identifiable cost in relation
to the size and operating cost of the employer, and the number of individuals who will in fact need a particular accommodation." 60 The Third Circuit
takes the position that the undue hardship test presents a low burden for the
defendant.6 1 While it may be the case that the harm need only be greater
than de minimis, proving such burden requires supporting facts. 62 "[A]n
employer does not sustain his burden of proof merely by showing that an
accommodation would be bothersome to administer or disruptive of the
operating routine." 63 "An employer must present evidence of actual undue
hardship and may not rely on speculation or 'hypothetical hardship."' 64
"'The magnitude as well as the fact of hardship must be determined by examination of the facts of each case.' 65
Because by statute the undue hardship must be "'on the conduct of the
employer's business,"' and the main objective of industry in general is profit, the majority of case precedent classifies hardship in economic termsbut courts may also consider noneconomic hardship.66 In Lewis v. New York
City TransitAuth., the defendant Transit Authority asserted that to exempt a
Muslim employee from wearing a Transit Authority cap "would have
not serving customers but still requiring employee to serve customers fails to accommodate the religious
conflict and thus is not reasonable).
59. Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 67 (1986) (citing Trans World Airlines, Inc.
v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977); accord EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, (2008), 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2
(1995)).
60. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2 (1995).
61. E.E.O.C. v. GEO Grp., Inc., 616 F.3d 265, 273 (3d Cir. 2010) ("[T]he Supreme Court's decision in [Hardison,432 U.S. 63] strongly suggests that the undue hardship test is not a difficult threshold
to pass.").
62. GEO, 616 F.3d at 265.
63. Gordon v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 791 F. Supp. 431, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (quoting
Draper v. U. S. Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515, 520 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1293
(1988)) (citation omitted).
64. Id. at 436 (quoting Toledo v. Nobel-Sysco, Inc., 892 F.2d 1481(10th Cir. 1989) aff'd and
remanded, 107 S. Ct. 367 (1986)).
65. Toledo, 892 F.2d at 1492 (emphasis in original); see, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Abercrombie & Fitch
Stores, Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1287 (N.D. Okla. 2011) rev'd on other grounds and remanded, 731
F.3d 1106 (10th Cir. 2013) rev'd on other grounds and remanded, 135 S. Ct. 2028 (2015) (expert opinion that it would be damaging to the very important "in-store experience" and brand image, which is the
core driver of sales, to permit an employee to wear a headscarf in conflict with Abercrombie's policy is
insufficient to demonstrate undue hardship without accompanying data analysis).
66. E.E.O.C. v. Townley Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 615 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000(e)(j) ("Cost cannot always be measured in terms of dollars.")).
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caused it to lose control of its public image-an undue hardship." 6 7 In con-

sidering the alleged hardship, the court stated that it could not conclude as a
matter of law that a religious accommodation would have had anything
more than a de minimis effect on the Transit Authority's public image without supporting factual evidence,68 and evidence that the defendant provided
exceptions unrelated to religious exercise undercut the undue hardship argument. 69 Likewise, evidence that the policy preventing religious exercise
is not effectively enforced cuts against the defense.70
The threat of criminal action, fines, and expulsion from a profession can
constitute an undue hardship. In United States v. Board of Educationfor
the School District of Philadelphia,Ms. Reardon was a substitute teacher
who after embracing her devotion to the religion of Islam began teaching
with a headscarf.72 On three separate occasions she was told that she could
not teach in her religious clothing, provided an opportunity to go home and
change, to which she refused and was not allowed to teach. In addressing
discrimination claims against the School Board, the Third Circuit reasoned
that the Supreme Court recognized that undue burden may be noneconomic
when it held that forced deviation from a seniority system established
through a collective-bargaining agreement-in order to accommodate an
employee's observance of the Sabbath-can constitute an undue burden.74
The Third Circuit determined that the School Board would have faced an
undue hardship by accommodating Ms. Reardon because it would have
forced the Board to violate Pennsylvania's Garb Statute75 (the history of
which will be revisited later in this Article), which prohibited teachers from
wearing religious garb in school and imposed enforcement by administra-

67. Lewis v. New York City Transit Auth., 12 F. Supp. 3d 418, 445 (E.D.N.Y. 2014).
68. Id. at 445-46 ("[T]he Transit Authority has not adduced any evidence supporting its contention
that permitting Lewis to wear her [headscarfj without a cap on top of it and without affixing a logo to
her forehead would have been anything more than a de minimis imposition on the Transit Authority's
headwear policy.").
69. Id. at 445 ("The Transit Authority does not dispute that it permitted other bus drivers to deviate
from its headgear policy without compromising its public image. For example, after the September 11,
2001 terrorist attacks, bus drivers were permitted to wear FDNY hats in solidarity with the fire department.").
70. Id. ("[A] survey conducted by the DOJ found over 300 violations of the headwear policy in
just 11 hours in 2005.").
71. United States v. Bd. of Educ. for Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 911 F.2d 882, 890-91 (3d Cir.
1990).
72. Sch. Dist ofPhiladelphia,911 F.2d at 884.
73. 1d at 884-85.
74. Id at 887 (relying on Hardison,432 U.S. at 78-83); Id. at 84 (The Supreme Court in Hardison
went on to hypothesize the costs, and defined undue hardship to be anything more than de minimis.).
75. Act of June 27, 1895, No. 282, 1895 Pa. Laws 395 (West 1992) (codified as amended at 24 Pa.
Stat. § 11-1112).
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tors, carrying the weight of a misdemeanor charge, fines, and discharge
from employment.
Civil rights law "does not require that safety be subordinated to the religious beliefs of an employee." 7 7 "A religious accommodation that creates a
genuine safety or security risk can undoubtedly constitute an undue hardship for an employer-prison." 7 8 When safety is the purported undue hardship within the prison context, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has accepted employer testimony standing alone.7 9 In the case of potential physical harm to employees or inmates, the Court did not require factual findings
supporting the danger, but allowed the policy to "stand on the testimony of
[the employer]." 80 It is important to keep in mind the prison context in
which this deference was awarded. The Court analogized the prison context
to the police context and thereby relied heavily upon a prior police uniform
case, Webb v. City of Philadelphia."' In Webb,82 the court analogized the
police uniform to the military uniform, and relied on the Supreme Court
case Goldman v. Weinberger, which held that the Air Force's uniform enforcement of its dress code was not an unconstitutional burden on an officer's free exercise of his religion.83 Even if a court were to apply the Third
Circuit's liberal view of what is required to prove a safety risk, it may be a
stretch to apply the same amount of deference to a hospital as courts have
historically given to prisons and the military.84
A.

Mitigating The SpreadofInfectious Disease

Scientific evidence that a burqa would present a higher risk of the spread
of disease and bacteria would go a long way towards demonstrating undue
hardship.85 Existing studies indicating the importance of routinely changing
a nurse's protective gown and mask may be of use. Under the General Duty
Clause of Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA")-76. Sch. Dist. ofPhiladelphia, 911 F.2d at 890-91.
77. Draper v. U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515, 521 (6th Cir. 1975).
78. GEO, 616 F.3d at 273 (within the prison context, headscarves may be used to injure an employee, smuggle in contraband, and as a means to avoid identification on surveillance video).
79. Id. at 270.
80. Id. at 274 ("[A] prison should not have to wait for a [headscarf] to actually be used in an unsafe or risky manner, risking harm to employees or inmates, before this foreseeable risk is considered in
determining undue hardship.") (alteration in original).
81. Id. at 273 ("[Webb v. City of Philadelphia, 562 F.3d 256 (3d Cir. 2009)] is relevant to this case
by analogy, as some security and uniformity interests held by the police force are also implicated in the
prison context.").
82. Webb, 562 F.3d at 260-62.
83. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 510 (1986) (Yamaka as religious garb).
84. See GEO, 616 F.3d at 265; see also Webb, 562 F.3d at 256.
85. This Article does not delve into the scientific complexities of the spread of common infections
due to improper hygiene, but only briefly addresses the issue.
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gloves, a gown, and a mask-are required for any potential infectious disease exposure. Following potential exposure, the outside front and sleeves
of the gown, outside of the mask, and outside of the gloves are considered
"contaminated." 8 7 Procedure for removal of protective gear is detailed and
specialized to ensure the patient does not touch a contaminated area.88 Factual demonstration that the procedure could not be replicated for a loosefitting burqa would be useful to proving undue hardship. However, such
risk may be avoided by fitting the protective gear for wear over the burqa.
Furthermore, such risk may not be an issue outside the operating room or
potentially infectious area-potentially creating a reasonable accommodation by restricting the nurse's activity to outside such areas.8 9
B.

Identification

A burqa is unlike the more commonly presented headscarf in that it completely prevents visual identification, which may present a safety risk in the
hospital setting. "[I]f an individual's religious headgear is or can be worn in
a manner that does not inhibit visual identification of the employee, and if
temporary removal may be accomplished for security screens and to address smuggling concerns without undue hardship, the individual can be
accommodated." 90 The EEOC's guidelines imply the question: must an
employer accommodate religious clothing that does not allow for visual
identification of the employee? Further, what is the answer to this question
when presented in an environment in which employees are required to wear
their photo I.D. in a forward facing fashion at all times in order to preserve
safety and prevent crime?91 The ability to identify employees is particularly
important for a hospital charged with caring for and managing access to
incapacitated persons and unaccompanied children.
Identification at the onset of the nurse's shift may be accomplished relatively easily and at little to no cost. While the Transportation Security Administration (T.S.A.) does not publicize its policy for the identification of a
86. CTR FOR DISEASE CONTROL, GUIDANCE FOR THE SELECTION AND USE OF PERSONAL
PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT (PPE) IN HEALTHCARE SETTINGS, http://www.cdc.gov/HAI/pdfs/ppe/

PPEslides6-29-04.pdf (last visited July 7, 2015).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See Kathy Dix, Apparel in the Hospital What to Wear, Where?
http://www.infectioncontroltoday.com/articles/2005/03/apparel-in-the-hospital-what-to-wearwhere.aspx

(2005)

90. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, RELIGIOUS GARB AND GROOMING IN THE
WORKPLACE: RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, Example 18 Head Coverings that Pose Security Con-

cerns, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/qa religiousgarbgrooming.cfm#_ftnrefl6 (last visited
April 27, 2016).
91. NewYork-Presbyterian, Crime Prevention at New York-Presbyterian, NYP.ORG,
http://www.nyp.org/about-us/safety/security/crime-prevention (last visited Apr. 27, 2016).
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passenger whose face is fully veiled, its policy on determining whether
there is a detectable threat underneath a head covering may be a useful indication. "Ifan alarm cannot be resolved through a pat-down, you may ask
to remove the head covering in a private screening area."9 2 Since the Qur'an
is not interpreted to require a Muslim woman to cover herself when in the
exclusive company of other women and young children, the removal of a
Muslim woman's burqa by a female colleague within the confines of a private room would not violate her religious tenets.93
Accommodation during the nurse's shift may be more problematic. According to a New York Times article on religion in the workplace, in order
to accommodate a female Muslim employee, I.B.M. had two badges created: the first containing a picture of her fully veiled for general use around
the office; and the second identification card containing a photo of her face
uncovered that she carried in her purse and would only be required to show
when asked by a female security officer. 94 While the monetary cost of requiring a female hospital employee to take an accommodated nurse to the
ladies room for identification may be minimal, such a procedure performed
in the middle of a shift may interfere with the timely care of patients. And
even if such accommodations are sufficient to provide for the identification
of the nurse by the employer, they are inadequate for providing the patient
with the ability to visually identify his or her caregiver.
V.

BEYOND UNDUE HARDSI-IP-THE PRIMARY FUNCTION
OF THE HOSPITAL

"A religious choir singing in a hospital chapel may well be desirable but if
that interferes with patient care, it cannot be allowed." 95
- Supreme Court Justice Warren Burger
There are two defenses to religious discrimination other than demonstrating undue hardship: business necessity9 6 and bona fide occupational qualification.97
92. Transp. Sec. Admin., Frequently Asked Questions, TSA.GOv, https://www.tsa.gov/
travel/frequently-asked-questions (last visited Aug. 15, 2015).
93. Aliah Abdo, The Legal Status ofHyiab in the United States: A Look at the SociopoliticalInfluences on the Legal Right to Wear the Muslim Headscarf, 5 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 441, 449
(2008).
94. Kelley Holland, When Religious Needs Test Company Policy, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/25/business/yourmoney/25mgmt.html?r-0.
95. N.L.R.B. v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 442 U.S. 773, 791 (1979) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
96. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2016).
97. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2016).
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Within the hospital setting, the safe care of patients is of the highest order. In a case upholding a hospital's ban on union solicitation in patient
areas, Chief Justice Burger wrote:
The central 'business' of a hospital is, not a business in the sense that term
is generally used in industrial contexts. The hospital's only purpose is the
care and treatment of its patients .

. .

. Whatever doubts there may be as to

the adverse effects on patients should be resolved in favor of their protection. I would not elevate the [labor] interests of . .. employees, whose
highest duty is to patients, to a higher plane than that of the patients. 98
If one is to accept the empirical evidence that it is important to see someone's face in order to communicate and establish a relationship, then it is
hard to imagine a place where these abilities are more important and the
consequences of failure to perform such functions greater than in the hospital. The Third Circuit has determined that the ability of a patient to communicate problems with medical staff may justify outright gender based
discriminatory hiring practices in the hospital setting. 99 For the hearing impaired, communication with a fully veiled nurse may inhibit communication. According to a report by the Center for Disease Control and Prevention ("CDC"), approximately 15% of American adults aged 18 and over
report some trouble hearing. 100 Nearly 25% of those aged 65 to 74 and 50%
of those who are 75 and older have a disabling hearing loss. 10 1 According to
the CDC, 24.87% of persons aged 65-74 ended up in the hospital in 2010,
while the figure was 39.83% for persons aged 75-84, and 56.68% for persons aged 85 and over. 10 2 Based on data from United States Census Bureau
in 2010, persons aged 65-74 made up 7.03% of the population, 75-84 made
up 4.23%, and 85 and over made up 1.78%.103 We can extrapolate from this
data that at least 4.44% of hospital patients have a hearing impairment that
qualifies as a disability (this number does not include persons under the age
of 65). This means that for roughly one out of every twenty patients a nurse
98. Baptist, 442 U.S. at 793 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (upholding hospital's ban on union solicitation in corridors and sitting rooms on patient floors, rather than exclusively within immediate patient
care areas).
99. See Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hosp., 78 F.3d 128, 133 (3d Cir. 1996) ("A [gender]
balanced staff is . . . necessary because children who have been sexually abused will disclose their
problems more easily to a member of a certain sex, depending on their sex and the sex of the abuser.").
100. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SUMMARY HEALTH STATISTICS FOR U.S. ADULTS:
NATIONAL
HEALTH
INTERVIEW
SURVEY,
2012
1OD
NO.
260,
5
(Feb.
2014)

http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr10/sr10 260.pdf
101. National Institute on Deafness and Other Communication Disorders, Quick Statistics About
Hearing, NIH, https://www.nidcd.nih.gov/health/statistics/quick-statistics-hearing#5 (Last updated June
17, 2016).
102. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 2014, 299 (2015),
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/husl4.pdf#089.
103.

See

U.S.

CENSUS

BUREAU,

AGE

AND

SEX

COMPOSITION:

2010,

4

(2011),

http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2OlO/briefs/c2OlObr-03.pdf.
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in a burqa serves would present significant difficulty in terms of communication, 104 not to mention potential problems faced by 15% of the population
with a less severe hearing disorder.
A.

The Business Necessity Defense

The Supreme Court in 1971 articulated the "business necessity" defense
to a claim of unintentional discrimination, i.e. an act that is neutral on its
face but has a discriminatory impact, known as "disparate impact.""'o The
defense was later explicitly included as an exception under Title VII by
Congress in 1991.106 If an employer's discriminatory policy has an actual
impact on job performance, i.e. an employment requirement that is related
to the job, and there is no less discriminatory alternative method, then it
may be justified. 107 Such impact cannot be abstract or tangential. 0 8 The
Supreme Court invalidated job requirements consisting of an aptitude test
and a high school diploma--qualifications the Company claimed would
improve the overall quality of the work force, but which also had a discriminatory impact against black applicants-relying on the fact that employees
hired before the imposed requirement performed satisfactorily and received
Many courts have used the language "necessary to the safe
promotions.
and efficient operation of the business[,]" 0 while the Supreme Court has
indicated that "job-relatedness" and "necessary to the safe and efficient
operation of the business" are two sides of the same coin.' 1 1
104. Rice v. Schuyler Cty. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 183 A.D.2d 974, 975-76 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dept
1992) ("[P]ersons with a hearing loss like petitioner's can learn to compensate by using visual and
contextual cues, [however], as attested to by respondents' audiologist, . . . such hearing loss increases
the probability that petitioner will have difficulty understanding when those cues are removed.").
105. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
106. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 578 (2009); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1) (2016).
107. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1); see Merrick T. Rossein, 1 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
AND LITIGATION § 2:35 (Rel. 15 2010) ("[C]ourts have upheld employment practices that disproportionately exclude minorities if that practice is related to skills that result in better job performance.").
108. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1).
109. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. at 427, 431.
110. Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245, 249 ( 10 a Cir. 1970); United States v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 662 (2d Cir. 1971); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791,
798 (4th Cir. 1971); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co., 502 F.2d 1309, 1321 (7th
Cir. 1974); United States v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 464 F.2d 301, 308 (8th Cir. 1972); Watkins v. Scott Paper, 530 F.2d 1159, 1171 n. 15 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861, 97 S. Ct. 163, 50
L.Ed.2d 139 (1976).
111. Williams v. Colorado Springs, Colo., Sch. Dist. No. 11, 641 F.2d 835, 840 n.2 (10th Cir. 1981)
("The job-relatedness and the safety and efficiency standards are simply different sides of the same coin
.... The Supreme Court has, in fact, indicated that the two terms are interchangeable. In Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, the Court stated that if the employer shows that 'its tests are "job related," it remains open to the complaining party to show that other tests or selection devices, without a similarly
undesirable racial effect, would also serve the employer's legitimate interest in "efficient and trustworthy workmanship."' 422 U.S. 405, 425 [] (1975) (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792, 801, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 1823, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) (emphasis added)); see alsoDothard v.
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While the business necessity defense centers on job performance, courts
have also looked to other circumstances impacting the purpose of the business.11 Mr. Manjit Singh Bhatia, a machinist at Chevron, filed discrimination charges against the company when it refused to allow him to maintain
his position without shaving his face. 113 Mr. Bhatia, as a Sikh, refused to
shave his facial hair, which prevented him from achieving an air-tight seal
when wearing a respirator.1 14 Since the duties of a machinist involved potential exposure to toxic gases, all machinists were required to abide by the
no-facial-hair policy instituted in order to comply with the directions of
state occupational safety regulators. 115 The court found that allowing Mr.
Bhatia to continue to operate as a machinist would either open the company
to liability for failing to comply with safety regulations, or if they allowed
him to avoid duties that required the use of a respirator, would place too
great a burden on scheduling and on his co-workers for taking on a greater
share of potentially hazardous work.' 16
A patient's comfort has been deemed a business necessity in the hospital
setting. An employee who was instructed to speak only in English when
in the vicinity of patients sued New York Presbyterian Hospital for discrimination. 18 Jose Pacheco, who did not dispute the facts put forward by the
hospital, worked in a unit of the Hospital's Patient Financial Services Department on the first floor of the hospital. 119 Mr. Pacheco's supervisors had
received several complaints from patients who felt that Mr. Pacheco was
speaking about them in Spanish and laughing at them with his coworkers. 120 When analyzing the plaintiffs discrimination claim, the court
accepted the hospital's business necessity to ensure that patients felt comfortable that they were not being talked about or ridiculed surreptitiously by
hospital personnel. 12 1 It is likely that a patient's comfort is even more im-

Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331 & n.14 (1977) (the Court stated in reference to the job-relatedness standard that "a discriminatory employment practice must be shown to be necessary to safe and efficient job
performance to survive a Title VII challenge.").
112.

See Merrick T. Rossein, 1 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW AND LITIGATION

§ 2:35

(Rel.

152010).
113. Bhatia v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 734 F.2d 1382, 1383 (9th Cir. 1984).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1384.
117. Pacheco v. New York Presbyterian Hosp., 593 F. Supp. 2d 599, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (patient
comfort in knowing that hospital staff were not discussing their condition surreptitiously or ridiculing
them was a justifiable business necessity in employing requiring patients to speak only in English
around patients).
118. Id. at 606.
119. Id. at 604-05.
120. Id. at 606.
121. Id at 621.

Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 2016

15

North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 39, No. 1 [2016], Art. 4

48

NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:1

portant after being admitted to the hospital than at the billing station, where
Mr. Pacheco worked.1 2 2
The Fourth Circuit has confronted a discrimination claim by a nurse who
was fired because her overly conservative dress made patients feel uncomfortable. 12 3 Lori Kennedy, a nursing assistant at St. Catherine's Nursing
Center, a religious facility maintained in accordance with Catholic principles and where prayers were read over the intercom, was fired for wearing
overly modest garb that included a long dress and a head cover.124 Her supervisor told her that her mode of dress was making residents and their
family members feel uncomfortable. 12 5 The court however did not reach the
question of whether the impact of the plaintiff's clothing on patients' comfort interfered with the business necessity of nursing or constituted an undue hardship, and instead dismissed her claims as exempt from discrimination laws under the religious organization exemption to Title VII,1 26 which
precludes claims of religious discrimination against a religious organization
like St. Joseph's. 127
While the EEOC specifically rejects customer preference as a defense to
discrimination, 12 8 it would be improper to conflate the comfort of a hospital
patient with mere preference. Even if a court was to accept this characterization, "'it is not the law that customer preference is an insufficient justification as a matter of law.""l 2 9 In applying a business necessity standard to
the retail food setting, where "store hygiene and an appearance of cleanliness is an important aspect of customer preference[,]" the employer may
institute a "no beard" policy without repercussion.1 30 Customer preference
in these situations is often expressed in terms of an undue hardship on the
employer.1 3 1 In the hospital setting, patients may be in a state of distresswhether it be because of extreme physical or mental pain, or fear of ailment
or even death. Adding unnecessarily to a patient's discomfort is not about
122. Id. at 605.
123. Kennedy v. St. Joseph's Ministries, Inc., 657 F.3d 189, 191 (4th Cir. 2011).
124. Id. at 190.
125. Id. at 190-91.
126. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(a) (2016).
127. Kennedy, 657 F.3d at 196.
128. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2 (2014) (bona fide occupational qualification).
129. Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d 126, 136 (1st Cir. 2004) (exemption of employee, and member of the Church of Body Modification, to company policy prohibiting the wear ofjewelry
on the face would create an undue burden because it would adversely affect the employer's public
image).
130. Woods v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 35, 43 (E.D. Va. 1976) aff'd. 579 F.2d 43 (4th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 930, 99 S. Ct. 1267, 59 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978).
131. See Cloutier, 390 F.3d at 126; Hussein v. Waldorf-Astoria, 134 F. Supp. 2d 591, 599
(S.D.N.Y. 2001), affd sub nom, 31 F. App'x 740 (2d Cir. 2002); Woods v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 420 F.
Supp. 35, 43 (E.D. Va. 1976), af'd. 579 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1978).
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the impact on a hospital's bottom line if a "customer" unplugs her respirator, disconnects the I.V., and chooses to march across town to the hospital's
nearest competitor. Helping a child suffering from leukemia to feel as comfortable as possible is so far ahead in importance to a grocery shopper's
concern over her butcher's scruffy appearance that it is outlandish to include the two in the same sentence. For those breathing their last breaths in
the hospital, the function of end-of-life care is to alleviate distressing symptoms of the patient, also termed "comfort care." 32
The business necessity exception is not applicable to a claim of intentional discrimination.
A claim of intentional discrimination may be
brought for a failure to accommodate a headscarf by a company with a "noheadwear" policy. 134 Thus it follows that a nurse may bring a claim of intentional discrimination for a failure to accommodate a burqa, even if the
hospital's action appears to be neutral. 135 Given the extensive use of masks
in hospitals, it appears likely that even the most employer-friendly of jurisdictions may deem a restriction on the wear of a burqa as a form of intentional discrimination.1 36 Further, "the absence of a malevolent motive does
not convert a facially discriminatory policy into a neutral policy with a discriminatory effect. Whether an employment practice involves disparate
treatment through explicit facial discrimination does not depend on why the
employer discriminates, but rather on the explicit terms of the discrimination."1 37 In the likely case that a hospital faces a claim of intentional discrimination, the hospital will need to rely on the bona fide occupational
qualification defense.
B.

The Bona Fide OccupationalQualificationDefense

Similar to a business necessity, although harder to demonstrate,' 3 and
considerably more narrow,1 3 9 a bona fide occupational qualification
(BFOQ) is a valid defense against a claim of intentional discrimination,

132. Craig D. Blinderman, M.D., & J. Andrew Billings, M.D., Comfort Carefor PatientsDying in
the Hospital, 373 NEw ENG. J. MED. 2549, 2549 (2015).
133. Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am., UAW v. Johnson
Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 197-98 (1991).
134. Abercrombie, 135 S. Ct. at 2034.
135. See id.
136. Id at 2039 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("If an employer declines to accommodate a particular
religious practice, yet accommodates a similar secular (or other denominational) practice, then that may
be proof [of intentional discrimination].").
137. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 199 (discussing the concern of lead exposure to female employees that may result in birth defects) (emphasis added).
138. Id. at 198.
139. Id. at 201.
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also known as "disparate treatment."l 4 0 The statutory exception written into
Title VII "limits the situations in which discrimination is permissible to
'certain instances' where ... discrimination is 'reasonably necessary' to the
'normal operation' of the 'particular' business."1 4 1 "[I]n order to qualify as
a BFOQ, a job qualification must relate to the 'essence,' [] or to the 'central
mission of the employer's business[.]"' 1 4 2 In Johnson Controls, the Supreme Court determined that a battery manufacturer's concern over birth
defects caused upon the children of female employees did not relate to the
essence of the business because elevated lead levels in her blood did not
impact her "ability to perform [] safely and efficiently .

.

. those aspects of

[her job] that [fell] within the 'essence' of the [battery manufacturer's]
business." 1 4 3
The safety of third parties which are "indispensable to the particular
business at issue" may, on the other hand, create a valid BFOQ, e.g. inmates to prisons and passengers to airline carriers.144 Within the context of
age discrimination, the Supreme Court has embraced a two-part enquiry
known as the Tamiani standard for establishing a BFOQ, which allows for
an escalation of job qualifications proportionate to "the likelihood of harm
and the probable severity of that harm" inherent in the essence of the business; so long as the "employer could establish that it 'had reasonable cause.
to believe, that is, a factual basis for believing, that all or substantially all
[persons over the age qualifications] would be unable to perform safely and
efficiently the duties of the job involved[;]"' or that it would be "'impossible or highly impractical' to deal with the older employees on an individualized basis."' 14 5 It does not require any stretch of imagination or lan14 7
guagel46 to state that the job of a hospital is the safe care for its patients.
And while a hospital "must have a 'basis in fact' for its belief that [discrimination is necessary to] perform the job in question[,] appraisals need not be
based on objective, empirical evidence, and common sense and deference to

140. Healey, 78 F.3d at 131 (citing Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 202-03) (discussing sex as a
BFOQ in the hospital setting).
141. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 201.
142. Id. at 203.
143. Id. at 206-07.
144. Id. at 203.
145. Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 412-17 (1985) (quoting Usery v. Tamiami
Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F. 2d 224, 235-36, (5th Cir. 1976)).
146. See Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 207 ("It is word play to say that 'the job' at Johnson [Controls] is to make batteries without risk to fetuses in the same way 'the job' at Western Air Lines is to fly
planes without crashing.").
147. N.L.R.B, 442 U.S. at 793 (Burger, J., concurring) ("The central 'business' of a hospital is not a
business in the sense that term is generally used in industrial contexts-[its] only purpose is the care and
treatment of its patients[.]").
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experts in the field may be used."1 4 8 The BFOQ defense has been recognized as valid within the religious discrimination context;149 valid in support of job qualifications that do not directly discriminate -on the basis of
religion, but on some aspect of that religion;so and within the context of
privacy, courts have accepted a hospital's contentions regarding a bona fide
occupational qualification without supporting factual findings. t5 1 Lastly and
to the point, the ability of a patient to communicate problems with medical
staff may give rise to a BFOQ in the hospital. 15 2
While there does not yet appear to be any quantified studies of the specific effects of a nurse wearing a burqa upon patient care as it relates to the
relationship between the patient and medical staff, one physician in Sudan,
where women practice medicine wearing a burqa, has articulated that in his
opinion there are "profound adverse effects on interaction with their patients."l'5 3 Evidence that the human brain is uniquely designed to recognize
faces;1 5 4 humans preference for facial stimuli;155 the natural social interac-

tion between humans through their eyes; 15 6 demonstrated by the highly
elaborate musculature on the face of primates allowing for communication
of a wider array of thoughts and emotions than other mammals;15 ' and evidence that facial expressions transcend cultures;158 all point to the im148. Healey, 78 F.3d at 132 (citing Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 335 (1977)) (relying on
expert testimony, not statistical evidence, to determine BFOQ defense and explaining that gender discrimination is necessary to adequately serve sexual abuse victim patients in the hospital setting); Torres
v. Wis. Dep't Health and Social Servs., 859 F.2d 1523, 1531-32 (7th Cir. 1988) (discussing when establishing a BFOQ defense, defendants need not produce objective evidence, but rather employer's action
should be evaluated on basis of totality of circumstances as contained in the record).
149. See e.g., Pime v. Loyola Univ. of Chi., 803 F.2d 351 (7th Cir. 1986) (explaining although the
university was not a religious organization exempt from Title VII, the court held that having some Jesuit
presence in the philosophy department, including in teaching roles related to applied ethics, philosophy
of law, and logic, was a BFOQ since university was founded by Jesuits, Jesuit "presence" was important
to the successful operation of the university, and the educational experience would be different without a
Jesuit presence); see also Kern v. Dynalectron Corp., 577 F. Supp. 1196 (N.D. Tex. 1983) (being Muslim where an employer hired pilots to fly into countries where only Muslims were allowed to enter is a
valid BFOQ), af'd, 746 F.2d 810 (5th Cir. 1984).
150. E.E.O.C. v. Sambo's of Ga., Inc., 530 F. Supp. 86, 91 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (explaining cleanshavenness is a bona fide occupational qualification for a manager of a restaurant).
151. See Backus v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 510 F. Supp. 1191, 1193 (ED Ark. 1981) ("The Court finds
merit in defendant's contention that the majority of women patients [in the obstetrics and gynecological
department] will object to intimate contact with a member of the opposite sex.").
152. See Healey, 78 F.3d at 133 ("A [gender] balanced staff is [] necessary because children who
have been sexually abused will disclose their problems more easily to a member of a certain sex, depending on their sex and the sex of the abuser.").
153. Awad Mohamed Ahmed, Ninja Turtles at Sudan Hospitalsand Medical Schools, 4 SUDANESE
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH 360, 364 (2009).

154. LEOPOLD, supra note 27, at 234.
155. PENNICK, supra note 32, at 634.
156. LEOPOLD, supra note 27, at 234.

157.
158.

Id. at 236, 239.
See EKMAN, supra note 40, at 305-08.
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portance of the face in social interaction. If a court is prepared to accept this
empirical evidence as relevant, if five percent of hospital patients have a
debilitating hearing disorder, and if communicationl59 and comfortl 60 are
important in the hospital setting, then a court may accept a hospital's qualification that a nurse's face not be covered because it relates to the central
mission of the hospital, i.e., the safe care of patients. And even if a court
does not accept this mass of tangential evidence as being on point, the court
may rely on common sense and deference to experts in the field so long as
the employer has a "basis in fact."1 61
VI.

THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
RESTORATION ACTS

A public hospital differs from a private one in that as a state actor, the
Constitution proscribes it from violating the rights of others, including its
employees. 162 The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibitingthe free exercise
thereof[,]"163 and' this proscription applies not only to the federal government but also city and state organizations. 164 The Free Exercise Clause
"embraces two concepts,-freedom to believe and freedom to act." 165 "The
first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be." 166 Therefore, "[c]onduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society."167 Historically, any challenge to government action on the basis of a
free exercise violation triggered the strictest of scrutiny, i.e., the least
amount of deference to the government's purported reasoning.168 Challenged conduct could only be validated by a compelling interest that was
narrowly tailored to effectuate that interest. 169 The Supreme Court has described compelling interests as those "of the highest order," 170 to be con159. See Healey, 78 F.3d at 133.
160. See Backus, 510 F. Supp. at 1191 (explaining that court accepted that female patients would
not be comfortable with male nurse in obstetrics and gynecology department); Pacheco, 593 F. Supp. 2d
at 599 (discussing hospital staff using foreign language to ridicule patients in surreptitious manner).
161. Healey, 78 F.3d at 132 (citing Dothard, 433 U.S. at 335) (relying on expert testimony, not
statistical evidence, to determine BFOQ defense); Torres, 859 F.2d at 1531-32(discussing when establishing a BFOQ defense, defendants need not produce objective evidence, but rather employer's action
should be evaluated on basis of totality of circumstances as contained in the record).
162. See Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, Ala., 417 U.S. 556, 566 (1974).
163. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
164. See Cantwell v. Conn., 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (applying the First Amendment to the states
via the Fourteenth Amendment).
165. Id. at 303.
166. Id at 303-04.
167. Id. at 304.
168. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
169. Id.
170. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993).
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trasted with the most deferential form of scrutiny-requiring only a "rational basis" as justification.17' The U.S. Supreme Court retreated from this
approach in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v.
Smith,1 72 and Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah.173
The Supreme Court in Lukumi cited Smith for the proposition that while
laws targeting religious conduct remain subject to strict scrutiny, "a law that
is neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by a compelling
governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening
a particular religious practice." 7 4 The Supreme Court in Smith held that
Oregon's criminal drug laws were neutral and of general applicability, and
thus the laws' impingement on the sacramental ingestion of peyote by
members of the Native American Church need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest.' 75 While Smith and Lukumi do not explicitly
mention the term "rational basis," lower courts have interpreted them as
imposing the most deferential form of review on neutral laws of general
applicability.1 7 6 Under rational basis review, "legislation is presumed to be
valid .

.

. [and] will be upheld 'if there is any reasonably conceivable state

1 77
of facts that could provide a rational basis for the [burden imposed].'
In response to the weakening of judicial scrutiny with respect to neutral,
generally applicable laws under Smith and Lukumi, Congress enacted the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) in 1993 - the same year
Lukumi was decided.1 7 8 The purpose of RFRA was to restore the compelling interest test that preceded Smith and Lukumi, "as set forth in Sherbert
v. Verner[]179 and Wisconsin v. Yoder[] 8 o and to guarantee its application
in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened; and to
provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by government."' 8 ' Although Congress intended RFRA to
apply to the states as well as the federal government, the Supreme Court
later held that this was an unconstitutional exercise of Congress' powers in

171. Lyng v. Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am., UAW,
485 U.S. 360, 375 (1988).
172. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
173. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 520.
174. Id at 531 (citing Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)).
175. Smith, 494 U.S. at 877-82.
176. See, e.g., Commack Self-Serv. Kosher Meats, Inc. v. Hooker, 680 F.3d 194, 212 (2d Cir.
2012).
177. Cent. Rabbinical Cong. of U.S. & Canada v. New York City Dep't of Health & Mental Hygiene, No. 12 CIV. 7590 NRB, 2013 WL 126399, at *32 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2013), vacated and remanded, 763 F.3d 183 (2d Cir. 2014) (internal citations omitted).
178. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb- (2016).
179. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 398.
180. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
181. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2016).
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City ofBoerne1 82 and invalidated application of the law to the states.183 Following City ofBoerne, Congress passed the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 1 84 which was enacted under
Congress's Commerce and Spending Clause powers. 185 RLUIPA removed
States from the definition of "government" in RFRA,186 while at the same
time included States and local government in the application of RLUIPA,
which applied only to land use regulation and burdens on prisoner." The
scope of application was limited to "a program or activity that receives
Federal financial assistance"; "the substantial burden affects, or removal of
that substantial burden would affect, [interstate commerce]"; or land use
regulation.188 Presently, challenges to governmental action under RFRA
remain subject to strict scrutiny even if the law does not target religion, 189
while challenges under the U.S. Constitution to governmental action that is
neutral and generally applicable, aside from that which is related to land use
and prisoner's rights, remain subject to the most deferential form of review
under Smith and Lukumi. 19 0
A.

The Free Exercise Rights of the Nurse

A dress policy requiring the use of an employee uniform is a neutral law
of general applicability. 191 A public hospital may rely on a uniform dress
attire policy in order to receive lesser scrutiny by the courts. "[A] uniform
requirement fosters discipline, promotes uniformity, encourages esprit de
corps, and increases readiness and having standardized uniforms encourages the subordination of personal preferences and identities in favor of the
overall group mission."1 92 "While [the uniform requirement] is doubtless of
most importance in a law enforcement context, there is no reason to believe
182. City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
183. Id.
184. The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), Pub. L. No.106-274, §§
7-8, 114 Stat. 803 (2000) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq. (2012)).
185. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2761 (2014).
186. The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), §§ 7-8.
187. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 715 (2005) ("Less sweeping than RFRA, and invoking
federal authority under the Spending and Commerce Clauses, RLUIPA targets two areas: Section 2 of
the Act concerns land-use regulation, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc; § 3 relates to religious exercise by institutionalized persons, § 2000cc-l.").
188. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc (2016).
189. See, e.g., Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2751.
190. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc, cc-1.
191. See, e.g., Kalsi v. New York City Transit Auth., 62 F. Supp. 2d 745, 761 (E.D.N.Y. 1998)
aff'd, 189 F.3d 461 (2d Cir. 1999) (policy of Transit Authority requiring its car inspectors to wear TAprovided hard hat which prevented employee from wearing turban at all times required by Sikh religion
is a neutral and generally applicable law).
192. Commc'ns Workers of Am. v. Ector Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 467 F.3d 427, 439 (5th Cir. 2006)
(internal citations omitted) (hospital setting).
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it is not of real significance in most of the many non-law enforcement contexts, both governmental and civilian, where uniforms are appropriately
required." 93 In order to preserve rational basis scrutiny, a defendant hospital would need to enforce its policy uniformly and without exception.1 94
A public hospital that does not impose a uniform on its nursing staff but
wishes to prohibit a nurse from wearing a burqa in patient care areas may
trigger the highest of judicial scrutiny. "[I]nvidiously discriminatory ordinances targeting a religious practice of a particular religion are subject to
strict scrutiny." 95 The defendant City of Hialeah in Lukumi-against a
background of legislative history indicating hostility towards the practice of
Santeria-imposed a ban on animal sacrifice that contained so many exceptions as to cause the ban to apply exclusively to the religious ceremony.' 96
"The Lukumi opinion [] declared the 'principle' that 'government, in pursuit
of legitimate interests, cannot in a selective manner impose burdens only on
conduct motivated by religious belief.' 197 Distinguishing Lukumi from
regulation prohibiting the performance of religious services on public
school grounds, the Second Circuit held that such prohibition was not in
violation of the Free Exercise Clause because (i) the regulations did not
intend to nor did they suppress a religious ritual of a particular religion; (ii)
there was no demonstrable "animus," i.e., hostility; and (iii) the government
interest was avoidance of Establishment Clause concerns.198
Lukumi's invocation of presumptive unconstitutionality and strict scrutiny
cannot reasonably be understood to apply to rules that focus on religious
practices in the interest of observing the concerns of the Establishment
Clause. The constitutionality of such rules must be assessed neutrally on
all the facts and not under strict scrutiny. 99
A hospital enforced ban on the covering of a nurse's face while at the
same time requiring surgical masks appears to single out Muslim women
for the practice of a religious ritual, i.e., the complete covering of a woman's face in public. The hospital may distinguish the mask by its limited use
- unless of course that use is not limited. The Department of Health for the
State of New York adopted a regulation in 2013 requiring unvaccinated
hospital personnel-including doctors and nurses-to wear during influen193. Id. at 440.
194. See Litzman v. New York City Police Dep't, 2013 WL 6049066, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15,
2013) (relying on Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 534) (policy limiting facial hair growth was not uniformly enforced and contained exceptions, and thus strict scrutiny was applied).
195. Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ. of City of New York, 750 F.3d 184, 190 (2d Cir.
2014) cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1730 (2015) (citing Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 534).
196. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 525-26.
197. Bronx Household, 750 F.3d at 192 (quoting Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 543).
198. Id. at 191-95.
199. Id. at 195.
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za season a surgical or procedural mask at all times when in areas where
patients or residents may be present. 200 The regulations were amended in
2014 to narrow slightly the applicability of the mask-wearing requirement
from an area where patients "may be present" to where they are "typically
present[;]" and to include exceptions for personnel providing speech therapy or working with a patient who reads lips. 2 0 1 In a challenge to the regulations brought by the hospital worker's union and four nurses, the Court
dismissed the complaint, determining that the State correctly adopted the
regulations bearing in mind the risk to patient health presented by the
spread of influenza in health care facilities.202 A hospital requiring a nurse
to wear a surgical mask when interacting with patients, while prohibiting
her from wearing a burqa, may have difficulty in selling the argument that
the prohibition does not invidiously target the nurse's religion. An exception when handling patients that read lips indicates that it is important for a
nurse to be able to remove her mask when dealing with patients who have
difficulty hearing, which may be a rational basis for disallowing a burqa or
niqab, but if the court determines that such action targets the burqa because
it is a burqa, the city hospital will be required to climb a much steeper
mountain than the plains of rational basis. 203
In States that have passed their own religious freedom restoration acts,
any act "substantially burden[ing]" religion can only be legally valid if it is
in furtherance of a "compelling governmental interest[,]" and the act is the
"least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest." 204 Within the context of religious freedom restoration laws, there is a
split among the Circuits as to whether religious exercise is "substantially
burdened" when it is not compelled or prohibited by the religion.205 Given
200. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. Tit. 10 § 2.59 (2016).
201. Spence v. Shah, 2016 NY slip op. 01386, 136 A.D.3d 1242, 1244 (App. Div.)
202. Id at 1246.
203. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 520; see also Smith, 494 U.S. at 872.
204. See 2015 Ark. Act 975, 2015 Ark. S.B. 975.
205. See Mack v. O'Leary, 80 F.3d 1175, 1178 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, judgment vacated,
522 U.S. 801, 118 S. Ct. 36, 139 L. Ed. 2d 5 (1997), and vacated, 151 F.3d 1033 (7th Cir. 1998) ("The
Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits define "substantial burden" as one that either compels the religious
adherent to engage in conduct that his religion forbids (such as eating pork, for a Muslim or Jew) or
forbids him to engage in conduct that his religion requires (such as prayer). see also Goodall by Goodall
v. Stafford County School Board, 60 F.3d 168, 172-73 (4th Cir.1995); Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517,
1522 (11th Cir.1995); Bryant v. Gomez, 46 F.3d 948 (9th Cir.1995) (per curiam). The Eighth and Tenth
Circuits use a broader definition-action that forces religious adherents "to refrain from religiously
motivated conduct," Brown-El v. Harris, 26 F.3d 68, 70 (8th Cir.1994), or that "significantly inhibit[s]
or constrain[s] conduct or expression that manifests some central tenet of a [person's] individual beliefs," Werner v. McCotter, 49 F.3d 1476, 1480 (10th Cir.1995), imposes a substantial burden on the
exercise of the individual's religion. The Sixth Circuit seems to straddle this divide, asking whether the
burdened practice is "essential" or "fundamental," Abdur-Rahman v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections, 65
F.3d 489, 491-92 (6th Cir.1995)).

https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol39/iss1/4

24

Newbill: A Nurse's Face: The Burqa in the Hospital

2016]

A NURSE'S FACE

57

some religious scholars interpret the Qur'an to require a woman to cover
her face and body in public, 20 6 and First Amendment jurisprudence that "the
guarantee of free exercise is not limited to beliefs which are shared by all of
the members of a religious sect[,]" 2 07 if a Muslim woman working in a city
or State hospital demonstrates adherence to this commandment, she will
likely receive protection under her State's RFRA even if her State lies within a Federal Circuit that requires religious compulsion or prohibitionmeaning in states with their own RFRA, any restriction on the wear of a
burqa,
intentional or otherwise, would likely trigger the strictest of scruti20 8
ny.

As for a nurse at a federal hospital, like the V.A., although any challenge
to a federal entity's action under the (federal) RFRA remains subject to
strict scrutiny,209 she would not be able to rely on RFRA-or even civil
rights claims-as a remedy for employment discrimination.2 10 It was not
until 1972 that Congress extended Title VII's protection to federal employees by way of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, which added the corresponding § 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-16.21 ' By 1976, the Supreme Court in an opinion delivered by Justice
Potter Stewart held that a federal employee's exclusive remedy for discrimination was through Title VII. 2 12 Clarence Brown-a black employee of the
General Services Administration who had been passed over for two promotion opportunities-alleged racial discrimination, but since he missed the 30
day window for filing a civil action under Title VII, he was barred from
bringing an action not only under Title VII, but also under the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1981.213 "[Since] Congress simply
failed explicitly to describe § 717 [of Title VII]'s position in the constellation of antidiscrimination law[,]" Justice Stewart wrote that "[the Court]
must, therefore, infer congressional intent in less obvious ways."214 Justice
Stewart went on to infer that Congress intended to create in 1972 an "exclu206. Cassandra M. Vogel, An Unveiling: Exploring the Constitutionality of a Band on Face Coverings in PublicSchools, 78 BROOK. L. REv. 741, 748 (2013).
207. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715-16 (1981) (challenging First Amendment).
208. Cf. Freeman v. Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 924 So. 2d 48, 56 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2006) (based on expert testimony, it is consistent with Islamic law that a woman unveil for medical needs and photo ID cards for police identification, and thus in such situations, the complainant is
"merely inconvenienced" as opposed to "substantially burdened").
209. See, e.g, Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2751.
210. See Francis v. Mineta, 505 F.3d 266, 271-72 (3d Cir. 2007); Harrell v. Donahue, 638 F.3d 975,
984 (8th Cir. 2011).
211. Brown v. General Services Administration, 425 U.S. 820, 824-25 (1976); Francis, 505 F.3d at
271-72.
212. Brown, 425 U.S. at 824-25.
213. Id. at 822-24.
214. Id. at 825.
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sive, pre-emptive administrative and judicial scheme for the redress of federal employment discrimination[," based on the "understanding of Congress[,]" "that federal employees who were treated discriminatorily had no
effective judicial remedy."215 He went on to support the decision with the
canon of statutory interpretation that resolves tension between specific statutes and general statutes in favor of specific statutes; 216 and the practical
effect that allowing Mr. Brown to sue the government under § 1981 would
allow the plaintiff to circumvent Title VII's procedural requirements for
federal employees.2 17 Justice Thurgood Marshall took no part in the Brown
decision-while Justice John Paul Stevens joined by Justice William Brennan dissented. Justice Stevens pointed out "Congress intended federal employees to have the same rights available to remedy racial discrimination as
employees in the private sector," and that since it is well settled that victims
of discrimination in the private sector are not limited to Title VII, 2 18 "federal employees should enjoy parallel rights."219 Moreover, "the General Subcommittee on Labor of the House Committee on Education and Labor rejected an amendment which would have explicitly provided that § 717 [of
Title VII] would be the exclusive remedy for federal employees."22 0 Courts
have since held that federal employees cannot bring an action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of their Constitutional rights for actions that
could instead be brought under Title VH. 22 1
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals in 2007, relying on Brown and legislative history put forth by the government defendants, held that a T.S.A.
employee could not rely on RFRA to redress the allegations that the T.S.A.
ordered him to cut his dreadlocks, and that when he refused, he was ordered
to sign a separation agreement terminating his employment.2 22 The defendants had put forward as evidence of legislative intent a "Senate Report on
RFRA, which in a section titled 'Other Areas of Laws Are Unaffected,'
noted that '[a]lthough the purpose of this act is only to overturn the Supreme Court's decision in Smith, concerns have been raised that the act
2 23
could have unintended consequences and unsettle other areas of law."'
The Report goes on to state that "'[n]othing in this act shall be construed as
215. Id. at 828-29.
216. See id. at 834-35.
217. See id. at 833.
218. Id. at 836; see also Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
219. Brown, 425 U.S. at 836 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
220. Id. at 838 (emphasis added).
221. See Ratliffv. City of Milwaukee, 608 F. Supp. 1109 (E.D. Wis. 1985), af'd 795 F.2d 612 (7th
Cir. 1986).
222. Francis,505 F.3d at 268, 272.
223. Brief for Appellees at *16-17, Francis, 505 F.3d 266 (3d Cir. 2007) No. 06-1293, 2006 WL
6222589 (quoting S. Rep. No. 103-111, at 12, 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N 1892, 1902).
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affecting religious accommodation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
[of 1964]."224 Whether Congress meant that RFRA should not undermine
Title VII's ability to redress employment discrimination or that Title VII
should limit RFRA to non-federal employees-the Third Circuit answered
in the latter.225
B.
The Free Exercise rights of the patientand the Establishment
Clause
While the EEOC specifically rejects customer preference as a defense to
discrimination,226 a patient's fundamental rights may justify such discrimination. In Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hosp., the Third Circuit held
that a balanced staff including both males and females on all shifts is necessary to treat sexually abused adolescents and ensure patients' privacy, i.e.
the hospital may discriminate based on sex to ensure this fundamental
right. 2 27 In Backus v. Baptist Medical Center, an Arkansas Eastern District
Court held that the essence of an obstetrics nurse's business is to provide
sensitive care for patient's intimate and private concerns, and thus the hospital's requirement that labor and delivery nurses in the obstetrics and gynecology department be female was a bona fide occupational qualification
for the job. 22 8 Footnote four of the opinion in Johnson Controls made clear
that "sex could [] constitute a [] bona fide occupational qualification when
privacy interests are implicated." 22 9
A city hospital must respect the fundamental right of a patient to freely
exercise religion.23 0 While the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment prohibits a city hospital from endorsing a religion, 2 3 1 prohibition of
non-proselytizing services of a hospital employee chaplain would interfere
with a confined patient's rights to practice his freely chosen religion, and
thereby violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.23 2 A state
224. Brief for Appellees, supra note 226, at 11.
225. See Francis, 505 F.3d at 272.
226. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2 (bona fide occupational qualification).
227. Healey, 78 F.3d at 132.
228. Backus, 510 F.Supp. at 1191, vacatedas moot, 671 F.2d 1100 (8t Cir. 1982).
229. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 206 n.4 (citing Backus, 510 F. Supp. at 1191).
230. See Carter v. Broadlawns Med. Ctr., amended 667 F. Supp. 1269 (S.D. Iowa), aff'd and modified in part 672 F. Supp. 1149 (S.D. Iowa 1987).
231. See Doe v. Small, 934 F.2d 743, 746 (7th Cir.), reh'g granted and opinion vacated, 947 F.2d
256 (7th Cir. 1991), and on reh'g, 964 F.2d 611 (7th Cir. 1992) (the core of the Establishment Clause is
prohibition of state endorsement of religion).
232. Carter, 667 F. Supp. at 1280 (relying on Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1985))
(providing chaplaincy services to armed forces does not generally violate the Establishment Clause);
Wilder v. Sugarman, 385 F. Supp. 1013, 1026 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) ("Where a state, as the administrator of.
. . hospitals needed to protect and preserve public health and safety, has been forced to assume control
over and responsibility for .. . patients entitled to practice their respective religions, ' reasonable oppor-
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paid chaplain must refrain from "proselytizing upon a captive audience of
patients" and the hospital must "ensure that those patients who do not wish
to entertain a chaplain's ministry need not be exposed to it." 2 33
The question that needs addressing for public hospitals is whether a
burqa-when worn by a nurse in the hospital-amounts to proselytizing.
The Supreme Court will readily find secular purpose in religious principles
in order to avoid invalidating state action that seems to endorse a particular
religion, even if those principles are expressed directly as text from the Bible.234 However, the court will strongly consider the coercive effect of the
act at issue. 23 5 Daily repetition of exposure to the Ten Commandments
within the school setting is sufficient to run astray of the Constitution while
a monument of the Ten Commandments on state grounds is "far more passive."236 Determination of whether the government violates the Constitution's proscription of the establishment of a religion "demands sensitivity
to any 'coercive pressure' imposed upon the relevant community on account of the challenged policy." 23 7 In a free speech case brought by a hospital workers' union against a hospital's "non-adornment" policy prohibiting
the employees from wearing buttons, the Fifth Circuit held that the policy
did not violate the First Amendment, noting that "the Hospital's patientsand their families-are in the nature of a captive, and essentially involuntary, audience with respect to whatever message is conveyed by buttons on
the uniforms of on-duty Hospital employees." 2 3 8 Relying on an Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals case in the prison context, a District Court in Iowa
likened patients to prisoners when it determined that "to forcefully expose
patients to religious doctrine" would violate not only the Establishment

tunities must be afforded ... to exercise the religious freedoms guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments without fear of penalty."') (relying on Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 n. 2 (1972) (reasonable opportunities to exercise religion must be provided to prisoners)).
233. Carter, 667 F. Supp. at 1282 (quoting Baz v. Walters, 782 F.2d 701, 709 (7th Cir. 1986)).
234. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (display of Ten Commandments monument had
historical purpose).
235. Id. at 693 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) ("[O]ur task would be far simpler if we returned to the original meaning of the word "establishment" than it is under the various approaches this
Court now uses. The Framers understood an establishment "necessarily [to] involve actual legal coercion.").
236. Id. at 691 ("The placement of the Ten Commandments monument on the Texas State Capitol
grounds is a far more passive use of those texts than was the case in Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39
(1980), where the text confronted elementary school students every day.").
237. Summum v. City of Ogden, 297 F.3d 995, 1010 (10th Cir. 2002) (relying on Good News Club
v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 115 (2001)).
238. Commc'ns Workers, 467 F.3d at 441 ("It is reasonable for the Hospital to conclude that its
service to patients and their families is enhanced by their not being involuntarily subjected to having
messages on matters of public concern indiscriminately conveyed to them . . . by on duty Hospital
employees.").
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Clause of the First Amendment, but also contravene the Free Exercise
rights of the patient given the captive nature of their stay at the hospital.2 39
In perhaps the most coercive environment-primary school-the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1894 had the opportunity to address the influence of a nun's habit. 2 40 The majority determined that it was valid for the
nun to wear her religious garb while teaching, even though it "conceded
that the dress and crucifix impart at once knowledge to the pupils of the
religious belief and society membership of the wearer." 2 4 1 The majority
opinion focused on the hostility towards Catholics apparent by the legal
action itself, noting "there never was a time when ministers of Protestant
sects were not frequently selected as teachers[,] [s]ome of [whom] wore in
the school room, where children of Catholic parents were pupils, a distinctively clerical garb." "In the 60 years of existence of our present school
system, this is the first time this court has been asked to decide, as matter of
law, that it is sectarian teaching for a devout woman to appear in a school
room in a dress peculiar to a religious organization of a Christian
church."242 The dissent felt otherwise:
[Catholic nuns] have renounced the world, their own domestic relations,
and their family names. They have also renounced their property, their
right to their own earnings, and the direction of their own lives, and bound
themselves by solemn vows to the work of the church, and to obedience to
their ecclesiastical superiors. They have ceased to be civilians or secular
persons. They have become ecclesiastical persons, known by religious
names, and devoted to religious work. Among other methods by which
their separation from the world is emphasized, and their renunciation of
self and subjection to the church is proclaimed, is the adoption of a distinctly religious dress. This is strikingly unlike the dress of their sex,
whether Catholic or Protestant. Its use at all times and in all places is obligatory. They are forbidden to modify it. Wherever they go, this garb proclaims their church, their order, and their separation from the secular
world, as plainly as a herald could do if they were constantly attended by
such a person.243
How can a court distinguish the message of one religious garb from that
of another? If a chaplain can wear his distinctively clerical garb in the hospital, spreading the word of God to those who want to hear it, why can't a
239. See Carter, 667 F. Supp. at 1282 (relying on Campbell v. Cauthron, 623 F.2d 503, 509 (8th
Cir. 1980) (exposure performed by volunteers given access to the prison)).
240. Hysong v. Sch. Dist. of Gallitzin Borough, 30 A. 482 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1894).
241. Id at 484.
242. Id
243. Id. at 485. In response to Hysong, the Pennsylvania legislature immediately enacted the antigarb statute that would be used nearly one hundred years later to excuse the Board of Education's failure
to accommodate a teacher's headscarf United States v. Bd ofEduc. for Sch. Dist. ofPhiladelphia,supra,
a case discussed earlier in this Article.
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nurse wear a burqa while remaining silent about her religion and caring for
patients? Is it that the nurse is more like a school teacher and the patient a
pupil-such that the message is different because it is unavoidable and constant-and therefore coercive? Even so, does that rise to the level of proselytizing?
VII.

CONCLUSION

There is no need to cite authority for the proposition that the hospital carries out one of the most-if not the foremost-function in society. People
who enter the hospital often do so in the final days, or the first days, or the
weakest days of their lives. Hospitals care for us and our loved ones when
we are at our most vulnerable. Facial cues and recognition are important to
communication and a patient's well-being, which provides an understanding of why a hospital may not want its nurses adorning a burqa and the potential defenses to a related discrimination suit. But then there are surgical
masks. They may be distinguished, effectively or not, from a burqa in that
they are necessary to accomplish the ultimate objective of patient care-to
be used sparingly. But when they are required at all times, how can a municipal hospital's restrictions on similar religious garb withstand the strict
scrutiny of religious freedom laws? Where this all leaves a nurse in a burqa
depends on whether she may avail herself of state religious freedom laws.
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